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MISSING THE FOREST FOR THE TREES: WHY SUPPLEMENTAL
NEEDS TRUSTS SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM MEDICAID
DETERMINATIONS
JEFFREY R. GRIMYSER *
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a middle-aged man who recently suffered from a stroke, causing him severe brain trauma. His disability is permanent, so he now lives in
a nursing home and needs frequent medical assistance. He has no income
because he can no longer work, but through Medicaid, his state helps him
out—paying for his health care because his assets are low enough to qualify him for the program. 1 Later, his family decides to place his limited assets in a trust, the purpose of which is to have Medicaid continue to pay for
his medical needs, but have the trust pay for items that Medicaid will not
cover, such as books, television, internet, travel, clothing, and toiletries. 2
Under the law of the state where the man lives, he becomes ineligible
for Medicaid when the trust is established. The policy behind the state law
is to prevent individuals who receive Medicaid from spending their available assets on non-medical needs. This law is especially critical now, as the
state has huge budget deficit issues partly because of increasing Medicaid
enrollment and expenditures. 3
In 1993, Congress enacted several trust provisions within the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA) 4 to prevent individuals from
sheltering their assets in trusts while receiving Medicaid. 5 OBRA has a
default rule that broadly mandates that income and assets contained in most
*.I would like to thank Professor Mary F. Radford of Georgia State University College of Law for her
substantive assistance on this issue. Additionally, many thanks to Elizabeth, the love of my life, and to
all of my family for their support during law school.
1. See Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933
(2013).
3. For example, during the recent recession, roughly from 2007 to 2009, national Medicaid
monthly enrollment increased by nearly six million and spending increased by thirteen percent. See
JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID SPENDING
GROWTH OVER THE LAST DECADE AND THE GREAT RECESSION, 2000-2009, at 1 (2011), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/8152.pdf.
4. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1399
(2003)).
5. See infra Part III.C.
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types of trusts be counted when a state Medicaid agency determines a person’s Medicaid eligibility. 6 But OBRA contains a narrow exception to the
default rule for special needs trusts or supplemental needs trusts (SNTs),7
so called because they supplement a person’s Medicaid by paying for items
not covered by Medicaid. 8 Thus, under federal law it is clear that the default rule does not apply to SNTs; however, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) fails
to indicate what laws states may enact to regulate SNTs.
SNTs are relatively unknown tools for individuals with disabilities to
receive Medicaid without “impoverish[ing] themselves,” but “there is a
long list of potential stumbling blocks” to use them. 9 To begin, the trust
must meet the elements for one of the three types of SNTs listed in the
Medicaid statute. 10 Additionally, the trust provisions have confused federal
courts, causing a recent circuit split about whether assets contained within
SNTs can be counted by state Medicaid agencies when they determine the
trust beneficiaries’ Medicaid eligibility and benefits. 11 On one hand, one
can read § 1396p(d)(4) as being mandatory, which would require all states
to exempt assets in SNTs when determining Medicaid eligibility. This
would allow the beneficiaries to continue using SNTs and remain eligible
for Medicaid, but would force the states, as payors, to cover more citizens
under Medicaid. On the other hand, one can interpret § 1396p(d)(4) as being optional, which would permit each state to enact laws that disqualify
beneficiaries of SNTs from receiving Medicaid. This would enable states to
save some of their limited resources, but would cause the beneficiaries to
lose their Medicaid benefits if they use SNTs.
This Note argues that § 1396p(d)(4) is best read as being mandatory
on the states based on the applicable statutory interpretation tools. This
issue has widespread implications because Medicaid is extremely important
to the health of many indigent people. For instance, a recent study showed
that expanding Medicaid eligibility has the potential to “significant[ly]
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3) (2006). Note, however, that use of the phrase “default rule” in
this Note is merely referring to a descriptive term to show that § 1396p(d)(3) applies to nearly all trusts,
rather than referring to the contract law term of art. See, e.g., Lewis, 685 F.3d at 333 (stating that in
§ 1396p(d)(3) “Congress established a general rule that trusts would be counted as assets for the purpose of determining Medicaid eligibility.”).
7. See § 1396p(d)(4).
8. Mary F. Radford & Clarissa Bryan, Irrevocability of Special Needs Trusts: The Tangled Web
That Is Woven When English Feudal Law Is Imported into Modern Determinations of Medicaid Eligibility, 8 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 1, 2 (2012). These trusts are also known as “special needs
trusts” because they are generally used for individuals with special needs. See id. at 2-7.
9. Tara Siegel Bernard, What’s a Pooled Trust? A Way to Avoid the Nursing Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2010, at F4.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See infra Part II.
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decrease” mortality rates of those eligible for Medicaid.12 Federal legislation requiring states to pay for health care also touches upon state concerns
over federalism. 13 However, this Note argues that individuals with SNTs
should be eligible for Medicaid because the SNTs were designed to supplement Medicaid, not prevent a person from receiving Medicaid.
Part I briefly explains the Medicaid statute, SNTs, and the OBRA
amendments. Part II explains the circuit split and examines each circuit’s
use of the statutory interpretation tools. Part III analyzes those tools to interpret § 1396p(d)(4), including the text, the legislative history, the Supreme Court precedent, and the agency interpretation. This Note then
argues that § 1396p(d)(4) is best read as being mandatory on the states
based on the purpose of the Medicaid statute and the structure of
§ 1396p(d). Finally, Part IV claims that the provision should be mandatory
also based on policy considerations, including assisting the beneficiaries
with disabilities, rejection of the states’ “sheltering assets” complaints, and
creating a uniform interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4).
I.

BACKGROUND OF MEDICAID, SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUSTS, AND
OBRA
A. The Medicaid Statute

In 1965, Congress established Medicaid under Title XIX of the Social
Security Act. 14 Enacted in response to national concerns over citizens’ lack
of affordable health care and rising medical costs, 15 Medicaid was designed
to help individuals without the financial resources obtain necessary medical
care through medical assistance plans. 16 It quickly became the primary
federal program for providing medical care to indigent people through public funding. 17

12. Benjamin D. Sommers, Katherine Baicker & Arnold M. Epstein, Mortality and Access to Care
Among Adults After State Medicaid Expansions, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025, 1029 (2012) (discussing
study showing mortality rates decreased over a five-year period in three states that expanded Medicaid
eligibility in comparison to neighboring states that did not).
13. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (holding that the
mandatory nature of the Medicaid expansion program under the Affordable Care Act was unconstitutional because Congress was “not free to . . . penalize States that choose not to participate in that new
program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding”).
14. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1965)). Further, Medicaid was enacted under Congress’ Spending Clause
authority. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 331-32 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
15. See Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 5.
16. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980).
17. Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 262 n.19 (1974).

442

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

As of 2012, Medicaid was the nation’s largest public health insurer,
with a population exceeding fifty-five million. 18 As a joint state and federal
program, Medicaid had a combined federal-state cost of $400 billion per
year. 19 To participate in the Medicaid program and receive federal funding,
a state must have its medical assistance plan approved by the Secretary of
the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). 20 On
average, Medicaid spending accounts for twenty percent of a state’s overall
budget, with the federal government funding about fifty to eighty-three
percent of those costs.21
States may choose whether to participate in the Medicaid program, 22
but the federal government encourages them to opt in to the program by
providing financial incentives. 23 If a state chooses to participate, then it
must comply with the federal regulations promulgated by the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which is a subdivision of the
HHS. 24 In practice, all fifty states have joined the Medicaid program. 25 As
long as the state’s Medicaid plan complies with the federal regulations, the
state Medicaid agency is responsible for the day-to-day administration and
supervision of the program. 26 This in turn allows each state to customize
their Medicaid programs while limiting costs.
To become eligible for Medicaid individuals must have “income and
resources [that] are insufficient to meet the cost of necessary medical services.” 27 Medicaid is generally given to two groups of individuals: the
categorically needy, who qualify for public assistance under the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) or other federal programs designed
to assist low-income groups; 28 and the medically needy, who meet the nonfinancial eligibility requirements of the categorically needy, but whose

18. John D. Blum & Gayland O. Hethcoat II, Medicaid Governance in the Wake of National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius: Finding Federalism’s Middle Pathway, from Administrative Law to State Compacts, 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 601, 610 (2012). Note that this figure does not
account for the recent Affordable Care Act expansion. Id.
19. Id. at 611.
20. Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1208 (2012).
21. Nat’l. Fed’n. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
22. Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 275 (2006).
23. See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
24. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 275. Note that the CMS was previously known as the Health Care Financing Administration. Id. at 275 n.3.
25. Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2011).
26. Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir. 2007).
27. Univ. of Wash. Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 634 F.3d 1029, 1031 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396-1 (2006)).
28. Pharma. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 651 n.4 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i) (2006)).
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income or assets are too high to qualify them as categorically needy.29
Once a state has opted in to the Medicaid program, it must provide assistance to the categorically needy, but may provide coverage to the medically
needy. 30
B. Supplemental Needs Trusts
A trust is generally a legal instrument where assets are held in the
name of the trust and managed by a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary. 31 Because the beneficiary does not own the assets in the trust, but has
an equitable right to use them, he or she may use the trust to avoid certain
legal requirements. 32
Supplemental needs trusts are a narrow category of trusts that help individuals with severe and chronic disabilities pay for items and services
that Medicaid will not cover. 33 This includes additional health care services
and equipment, specialized or unique therapy, private health insurance,
educational and vocational training, computers and software, case management services, and recreational activities.34 SNTs are commonly used
where a person with a disability receives a “‘lump sum’ of money from a
lawsuit, inheritance, or other source.” 35 The typically modest assets in
SNTs range from $10,000 to $150,000. 36
C. OBRA and § 1396p(d)(4)
In 1993, President Bill Clinton signed into law the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993. 37 Before OBRA, no federal law mentioned

29. Id. at 651 n.5 (citing § 1396a(a)(10)(C).
30. Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 569, 572 (1982).
31. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1546 (8th ed. 2004)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013). Similarly, the Medicaid statute defines a trust
as “any legal instrument or device that is similar to a trust but includes an annuity only to such extent
and in such manner as the Secretary [of the HHS] specifies.” § 1396p(d)(6).
32. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 332.
33. See Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1999). Note that third-party trusts,
in contrast to special needs trust, are established with a third party’s assets and OBRA does not regulate
them, so they are not the subject of this Note. See Bradley J. Frigon & W. Eric Kuhn, Which SNT, When
& Why, 5 NAT’L. ACAD. OF ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 1, 7 (2009).
34. See Joseph A. Rosenberg, Supplemental Needs Trusts for People with Disabilities: The Development of A Private Trust in the Public Interest, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 95-96 (2000). For a more
comprehensive list of goods and services that beneficiaries may use SNTs to pay for, see Ruthann P.
Lacey & Heather D. Nadler, Special Needs Trusts, 46 FAM. L. Q. 247, 260-61 (2012).
35. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 95.
36. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 97 n.27 (collecting cases).
37. Ira Stewart Wiesner, Obra ‘93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability, and Estate
Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679, 681 (1995).
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SNTs because only state laws regulated them. 38 OBRA was enacted partly
in response to the states’ budgetary crises caused by individuals abusing
Medicaid eligibility rules by hiding their assets in trusts to remain eligible
for Medicaid 39 or to provide an inheritance to their children and family. 40
Yet, OBRA significantly changed whether individuals could use trusts
while remaining eligible for Medicaid.41 In 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(3), Congress created a default rule: assets in a trust are considered available to the
individual, such that the state must count them when determining the individual’s Medicaid eligibility. 42 This rule is unquestionably mandatory on
the states based on the statute’s text. 43
In § 1396p(d)(1) and (4), however, Congress created a “limited exception” for SNTs: the default rule does not apply if a beneficiary uses an
SNT. 44 Specifically, § 1396p(d)(1) states, “subject to [§ 1396p(d)(4)], the
[default] rules . . . shall apply” to Medicaid eligibility and benefits determinations. 45 Section 1396p(d)(4) then states that the default rule “shall not
apply to any of the following [SNTs].” 46 As previously noted,
§ 1396p(d)(4) only states that the default rule does not apply to SNTs, but
fails to note what rules may apply to SNTs. This lack of guidance has
caused confusion among the courts and thus, the circuit split.
Further, Section 1396p(d)(4) lists three types of SNTs: individual, income, and pooled. 47 Because courts and scholars have referred to individual SNTs as special needs trusts, 48 to avoid confusion this Note will refer to
each SNT by the above names and all three trusts collectively as SNTs. All
three SNTs receive similar legal protection under OBRA, but there is a key

38. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1231 n.11 (D.N.M. 2008), aff’d,
579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009).
39. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 682-83.
40. Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 5-6.
41. Wiesner, supra note 37.
42. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 252 (2d Cir. 2009) (“In general, § 1396p(d)(3)
requires a state, in the course of determining whether an individual is eligible for Medicaid, to consider
assets placed in a trust by an individual seeking Medicaid benefits.”).
43. See, e.g., Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Section 1396p(d)(3) does
not merely ‘allow’ states to count trusts in determining Medicaid eligibility; it requires them to do so.”)
(emphasis in original).
44. Doar, 571 F.3d at 252.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(1) (2006).
46. § 1396p(d)(4).
47. See § 1396p(d)(4)(A)-(C).
48. See, e.g., Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir.
2005).
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distinction in who receives each type of trust’s remaining assets once the
beneficiary dies. 49
Individual SNTs enable people with disabilities to contribute their
own assets to pay for certain items. 50 The essential elements are: (1) the
beneficiary is disabled as defined under SSI; (2) the beneficiary is under
age sixty-five; (3) the trust was established for the beneficiary’s benefit; (4)
the trust was established by the beneficiary’s parent, grandparent, or legal
guardian, or by a court; and (5) the trust includes a payback provision,
which allows the state to be repaid with the remaining assets in the trust
when the beneficiary dies, up to the amount of total medical assistance paid
previously by the state to the beneficiary. 51
Income SNTs (or “Miller trusts”) 52 allow individuals living in nursing
homes to qualify for Medicaid in a state that has an income cap for Medicaid eligibility. 53 The essential elements are: (1) the trust was established
for the beneficiary’s benefit; (2) the trust consists of only the beneficiary’s
unearned income, which includes pensions, Social Security, and other accumulated income; (3) the trust includes a payback provision; and (4) the
beneficiary resides in a state that does not have a medically needy program
for nursing facility services. 54
Pooled SNTs are for beneficiaries with lower incomes, but unlike individual SNTs, these beneficiaries have pooled their resources together into
one trust to allow a non-profit organization to manage the trust and to reduce overhead expenses. 55 The essential elements are: (1) the beneficiary is
disabled under SSI; (2) the trust was established and is managed by a nonprofit organization; (3) each beneficiary’s trust account was established for
the beneficiary’s benefit; (4) each trust account is kept separately; (5) each
trust account was established by the beneficiary’s parent, grandparent, or
legal guardian, or by a court; and (6) the trust may pay back to the state any
assets remaining in the beneficiary’s account after his or her death, up to
the amount of total medical assistance paid previously by the state to the

49. That is not to suggest that the other distinctions between the SNTs are not crucial for the
parties or courts dealing these issues; however, these distinctions are not as relevant to this Note’s topic
of whether § 1396p(d)(4) should be read as being mandatory or optional on the states.
50. Reames, 411 F.3d at 1168.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2006). For the definition of disabled, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (2006).
52. Note that these types of trusts are called “Miller trusts” based on a federal district court case.
See Miller v. Ibarra, 746 F. Supp. 19 (D. Colo. 1990).
53. J.P. v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 920 A.2d 707, 711 n.3 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2007).
54. § 1396p(d)(4)(B). For further discussion of income SNTs, see Wiesner, supra note 37, at 72134.
55. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).

446

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 89:1

beneficiary. 56 Regarding this final element, unlike individual and income
SNTs, pooled SNTs are not required to include a payback provision because the trust may keep the remaining assets. 57
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since 2000, four federal circuits have considered whether
§ 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states, and therefore whether SNTs must
be exempt from Medicaid eligibility and benefit determinations.58 If an
individual creates an SNT in the Second 59 or Tenth Circuit, 60 then the provision is optional. These circuits have relied mostly on the lack of clear
statutory language requiring states to follow § 1396p(d)(4) and agency
interpretation. If, instead, the individual creates the exact same SNT in the
Third 61 or Eighth Circuit, 62 then the provision is mandatory. These circuits
have placed greater weight on the purpose of the Medicaid statute and the
structure of § 1396p(d).
A. The Second and Tenth Circuits: § 1396p(d)(4) is Optional on the States
In 2000, the Tenth Circuit, in Keith v. Rizzuto, 63 addressed whether
states must follow § 1396p(d)(4) when an individual places pension funds
into an income SNT. In that case, a man with dementia associated with
Alzheimer’s disease resided in a nursing home facility, where he likely
would remain for the rest of his life.64 Both he and his wife’s only sources

56. § 1396p(d)(4)(C).
57. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 349.
58. Note that nearly all of these circuits have analyzed § 1396p(d)(4) through claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a claim requiring the plaintiff to show that a federal statute “unambiguously
impose[d] a binding obligation on the States.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997). Because Medicaid contains no “federal enforcement mechanism” for individuals denied benefits, individuals may sue the state Medicaid agencies under Section 1983 for violations of the Medicaid statute.
Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413, 416-17 (2008). Here, the issue over whether § 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states comes into play because § 1983 requires the trust beneficiaries to show that they
had standing to sue the state Medicaid agencies by asking: (1) whether Congress “intended” that the
statute benefit the plaintiff; (2) whether the right is too “vague and amorphous that . . . [it] would strain
judicial competence”; and (3) whether the statute “unambiguously imposed a binding obligation on the
States.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41 (emphasis added).
59. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009)
60. See Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009); Reames v. Okla. ex
rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2005); Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th
Cir. 2000).
61. See Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
62. See Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc., v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2012).
63. 212 F.3d at 1190.
64. Id. at 1191.
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of income were his civil service and Veteran’s Administration pensions. 65
After applying for Medicaid, he created an income SNT to prevent his pensions from disqualifying him from Medicaid. 66 But the state’s Medicaid
regulations allowed individuals to establish SNTs only if their monthly
incomes fell short of the average cost of nursing home care in the region
where they reside. 67 The state Medicaid agency denied the man’s Medicaid
application because his monthly pension income was above his region’s
average. 68 In response, he sought declaratory and injunctive relief under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 69 arguing that the state regulations were invalid for two
reasons. 70 First, he argued that the state was barred from denying his Medicaid application based on the structure of § 1396p(d)—specifically, since
§ 1396p(d)(3) requires states to follow the default rule, and § 1396p(d)(4)
exempts SNTs from the default rule, then § 1396p(d)(4) must also be mandatory. 71 Second, he argued that the state regulation was preempted by
§ 1396p(d) under the Supremacy Clause because he could not comply with
both the state and federal laws. 72
The Tenth Circuit rejected both of his arguments. 73 First, it found that
he had “misapprehend[ed] the mandatory” nature of the Medicaid trust
provisions. 74 The court agreed with him that states must follow the default
rule, but § 1396p(d)(4) is precatory because it is only “an exception to a
requirement.” 75 The court found that based on the clear legislative purpose
and text, states are “free to decide” whether to count assets in SNTs when
determining an individual’s Medicaid eligibility.76 Second, his preemption
argument was rejected because an individual could comply with both the
state and federal laws by having a pension lower than the average monthly
cost of nursing home care in his region. 77
In Reames v. Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Health Care Authority, the
Tenth Circuit again analyzed § 1396p(d) in the context of whether Social
65. Id.
66. Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 2000).
67. Id. at 1191-92.
68. Id. Specifically, his combined pensions created a gross income of $4,867 per month; however,
his region’s average for nursing home care was $3,034 per month. Id. at 1191.
69. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (discussing § 1983).
70. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d at 1192.
71. Id. at 1193.
72. Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 (10th Cir. 2000).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s motion to dismiss his complaint
for failure to state a claim. See id. at 1193-94.
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Security income placed in an individual SNT is exempted from state Medicaid benefits determinations. 78 In Reames, a woman with a disability living
in a nursing home received Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits, her
sole source of income. 79 The SSD benefits were used almost entirely as copay for her monthly nursing home bills. 80 To prevent her SSD benefits
from being used as co-pay, she applied for Medicaid and placed her SSD
benefits in an individual SNT. 81 She hoped that by doing so, Medicaid
would pay for her nursing home care and the SNT would pay for her other
items and services. 82 The state Medicaid agency approved her application,
but required the woman to still use her SSD benefits as co-pay for her nursing home care. 83 The state Medicaid agency was following a federal Medicaid regulation governing co-pay that required it to reduce Medicaid
payments to nursing homes in an amount equal to the individual’s income,
which included SSD benefits. 84 In response, the plaintiff requested recovery for retroactive payments from the state for her past co-pay to the nursing home, and declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the state from
forcing her to make any future co-pay to the nursing home. 85
The Tenth Circuit first dismissed her request for retroactive payments
under the Eleventh Amendment. 86 In turning to the prospective remedies,
the court examined the federal law’s “conflicting” mandates.87 On one
hand, cross-references from § 1396p(d)(4) to the Social Security statute
suggest that “assets” placed in SNTs, including SSD benefits, are shielded
from Medicaid eligibility determinations. 88 On the other hand, the Medicaid regulation requires states to reduce Medicaid payments to individuals
78. 411 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 1166.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. Specifically, the state Medicaid agency required her to pay $796 of her $846 SSD benefits
to the nursing home as co-pay every month. Id.
84. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2005). Note
that this portion of the court’s opinion is referencing 42 C.F.R. § 435.733(a)(1) (West 2012).
85. Id. at 1167.
86. Id. at 1167-68. First, the Eleventh Amendment, which precludes individuals from suing the
state both directly and indirectly for recovery of money from the state treasury, barred her claims
against the state agencies. Second, the Eleventh Amendment barred her claims against the individual
officers because she named the state, not the officers, in her complaint. See id. at 1167-68.
87. Id. at 1169.
88. Id. at 1168-69. Specifically, individuals may contribute “assets” in SNTs without having them
treated as countable for Medicaid purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A) (2006). Assets are defined as
“all income and resources of the individual.” § 1396p(e)(1). For making Medicaid determinations, the
Medicaid statute then refers to the Social Security statute. See § 1396p(e)(2). Finally, the Social Security statute defines income as including governmental benefits, including SSD benefits. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382(a) (2006).
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based on their SSD benefits. 89 To resolve this conflict, the Tenth Circuit
looked to the applicable agency’s interpretation. 90
The State Medicaid Manual (SMM), in which the CMS fills gaps in
the Medicaid statute, 91 states that SSD benefits placed in an SNT are not
counted when determining Medicaid eligibility, but are counted under
“post-eligibility rules.”92 The post-eligibility rules state that once an individual is found eligible for Medicaid the state must count SSD benefits
when determining the amount of Medicaid benefits that the individual will
receive. 93 The plaintiff in Reames, however, argued that the SMM conflicted with § 1396p(d)(1), which requires states to not count income in SNTs
when determining both eligibility and the “amount of” Medicaid benefits. 94
To resolve the issue, the Tenth Circuit decided what level of deference
should be given to the SMM by applying the Supreme Court’s two-prong
test under Chevron. 95 First, whether Congress has spoken on the precise
issue, which if it has should be given the full effect of law. 96 Here, the specific issue was whether states were required to not count SSD benefits
placed in an SNT when determining an individual’s co-pay. 97 The Tenth
Circuit found that, after mining through the “haphazard and complex”
Medicaid statute, Congress had not addressed this precise question. 98 Under the second prong, the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation
only if it is “‘reasonable’ and ‘based on a permissible construction of the
statute.’” 99 Here, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the SMM had properly followed both the Medicaid and Social Security laws because the SMM
shielded income other than SSD benefits from Medicaid’s post-eligibility
rules. 100 In other words, the SMM was consistent with federal law because
it still provided “full protection” for other types of income funding SNTs,
89.
90.
91.
92.

Reames, 411 F.3d at 1168-69.
Id. at 1169.
See Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009).
Reames, 411 F.3d at 1169 (quoting CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., STATE
MEDICAID
MANUAL
§ 3259.7(C)(5)(b)
(2012)
[hereinafter
“SMM”],
available
at
http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Manuals/Paper-Based-Manuals-Items/CMS0
21927.html).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1169 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(1)).
95. The Tenth Circuit also noted that in this case the Chevron test was “helpful,” but “not necessarily dispositive.” Id. at 1170 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837
(1984)).
96. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1170 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843).
100. Id. at 1171.
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but it included a “narrow carve[d]-out” exception for SSD benefits placed
in SNTs. 101 Additionally, the plaintiff’s argument was mistakenly based on
a “tortured concatenation” of cross-references from § 1396p(d)(1) to the
Social Security statute. 102
Next, the plaintiff argued that by assigning her SSD benefits to her
SNT through direct deposit, the SSD benefits “belonged to the trust,” not
her, and the state could not count them when determining her co-pay.103
The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument based on the SMM, which exempts income in SNTs from Medicaid benefit determinations only if the
income “actually belongs to the trust and not the individual.” 104 However,
the court found that the plaintiff’s SSD benefits belonged to her as they had
“pass[ed] through [her] hands before arriving” in her SNT. 105 Moreover,
the Social Security statute specifically prohibits transferring or assigning
SSD benefits. 106
In 2009, the Tenth Circuit, in Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 107
addressed whether § 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states for an individual who transfers an injury settlement into an individual SNT. 108 In Hobbs,
a six-year-old boy was involved in a severe car accident that left him with
traumatic brain injuries and seizures requiring significant daily assistance. 109 Three years later, he received a large injury settlement agreement,
of which $1.1 million was placed in an individual SNT. 110 The trust’s corpus was partially used to pay the boy’s mother in exchange for caring for
him and to purchase assets for the family. 111 After the boy had already
begun receiving Supplemental Security Income and Medicaid benefits, the
state Medicaid agency reviewed his SNT and determined that he was disqualified from Medicaid for two reasons.112 First, the SMM required that
the trust be used for the beneficiary’s “sole benefit,” not the benefit of his
101. Id. at 1172-73.
102. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2005).
103. Id. at 1170 n.5.
104. Id. at 1170 (quoting SMM § 3259.7(B)(1)).
105. Id. at 1171.
106. Id. at 1171 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) (2006)).
107. 579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2009).
108. Id. at 1175.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1175-76. Specifically, the trust agreement contained a provision that allowed the boy’s
mother to receive reasonable compensation for caring for him, so she was paid for dressing, monitoring,
bathing, transporting, and training him. Id. at 1175. Additionally, the expenditures on family assets
included a fifty percent interest in his family’s land and home, home furnishings, homeowner’s insurance, home maintenance and improvement, and life insurance on the boy’s parents. Id. at 1175-76.
112. Id. at 1176. Additionally, the Social Security Administration ceased paying SSI to the boy
because his resources were above the $2,000 limit. Id.
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family. 113 Second, the state’s administrative code required that he only
have $2,000 in “countable resources” to be eligible for Medicaid, but his
trust far exceeded that amount. 114 In response, his family argued that
§ 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory on the states and thus, they were allowed to
place the settlement in the SNT without him losing Medicaid eligibility.115
Proceeding under Section 1983, his family sought monetary damages, an
injunction prohibiting the state Medicaid agency from treating the SNT as a
countable resource, and declaratory relief holding that the SNT complies
with § 1396p(d)(4). 116
The Tenth Circuit held that § 1396p(d)(4) did not “unambiguously
impose a binding obligation” on the states, and therefore the state could
count the assets in his SNT when determining his Medicaid eligibility.117
The court acknowledged that “[a]lthough the statute might have been read”
as being mandatory, “that construction [wa]s foreclosed by [its] opinion in
Keith.” 118 Also, because of Medicaid’s “extraordinarily complex set of
interlocking” statutes and regulations, the Tenth Circuit owed the SMM
deference because it was “consistent with statutory language, statutory
purpose, and [was a] reasonable” interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4). 119
Finally, in 2009, the Second Circuit weighed in on whether
§ 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory on the states in Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 120
which involved circumstances nearly identical to those addressed in
Reames. In Wong, a middle-aged man with a permanent disability lived in a
nursing home, and his sole source of income was SSD benefits. 121 After
Medicaid partially paid for his nursing home care, 122 the state Medicaid
agency reduced his Medicaid benefits and required him to use his SSD

113. Id. at 1176-77 (citing SMM § 3257(B)(6)).
114. Id. at 1176.
115. Id. at 1179.
116. Id. at 1177.
117. Id. at 1179 (quoting Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997)). Additionally, the Tenth
Circuit rejected the family’s arguments that other provisions within the Medicaid statute created mandatory obligations on the states because those provisions were not relevant to this case. See id. at 1181-83.
118. Id. at 1180.
119. Id. at 1187. Additionally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed that the boy’s substantive and procedural
due process rights were not violated when the state counted the assets in his SNT. Id. First, the court
rejected the substantive due process claim that the state had created unclear Medicaid standards because
the state provided a sufficient standard for when determining Medicaid eligibility. Id. at 1184-87.
Second, the boy’s procedural due process rights were not violated because he was provided with a fair
hearing, represented by his counsel, and permitted to submit evidence to an administrative law judge.
Id. at 1187.
120. 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 253.
122. Id. For example, the court noted that in May 2007, Medicaid paid $8,095.89 of his monthly
nursing home bill, which exceeded $9,000.00 per month. Id.
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benefits to pay for his nursing home care based on post-eligibility rules
under state law and the Medicaid regulations. 123 To stop this, the plaintiff
created an individual SNT and deposited the SSD benefits into the trust.124
The state Medicaid agency, however, still required him to use his SSD
benefits to pay for his nursing home care based on the SMM. 125 The SMM
provision at issue—the same one at issue in Reames—requires states to not
count income placed in an SNT, including SSD benefits, when determining
Medicaid eligibility, but count them for post-eligibility determinations. 126
In response, the plaintiff argued that the SMM was invalid because it
conflicted with the text of § 1396p(d)(1) and (4), which exempts SNTs
from eligibility and post-eligibility determinations.127 He also argued that
the structure of § 1396p(d) had created a “negative command” for the
states—specifically, since § 1396p(d)(3) was mandatory on the states, the
rules in § 1396p(d)(4) must also be mandatory. 128
To evaluate whether the SMM was invalid, the Second Circuit applied
the two-prong Chevron test. 129 First, the court held that there was ambiguity as to what post-eligibility rules Congress intended with § 1396p(d)(1)
and (4), 130 as those two provisions do not “provide any guidance” to the
state Medicaid agencies. 131 Second, the court ruled that the SMM did not
warrant Chevron deference because agency manuals generally do not merit
such deference.132 However, the SMM did warrant Skidmore deference,
123. Id. at 254. Specifically, the state calculated that his available income ($1,024.81) was almost
exactly the same as his SSD benefits ($1,401.00). Id. at 253-54.
124. Id. at 254.
125. Id.
126. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing SMM § 3259.7(C)(5)(b)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 256-57. Before addressing these arguments, the Second Circuit “assumed” that the man
had a private right of action under Section 1983 for “this appeal only” because his “claim on the merits”
was rejected. Id. at 254 n.9. The court then addressed the man’s additional arguments. First, the court
held that his reliance on Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk was misguided, as the “context” of the case made
his argument “at best dictum.” Id. at 257. Second, the court rejected his argument that Congress intended to include SSD benefits as “assets” when individuals place them in SNTs, because the provisions he
cited to only shield assets when individuals “create” SNTs, but say nothing about post-eligibility rules
once the SNT has been created. Id. at 258. Finally, the man’s procedural challenge to the federal regulation 42 C.F.R. § 435 was time-barred based on the Administrative Procedure Act’s rule that challenges
to regulations expire six years after the issuance of a regulation. Id. at 263.
129. Id. at 255-56.
130. Id. at 256 n.11.
131. Id. at 257.
132. Id. at 258. However, the court did not foreclose the possibility that the SMM warranted Chevron deference: according to the court, this issue “raise[d] an interesting question,” but the court was
“content simply to rely on the agency’s concession that Skidmore” deference was warranted. Id. at 259.
Nonetheless, the court hinted towards Chevron deference being inapplicable to the case. First, it noted
that the Secretary of the HHS “has neither ‘produced regulations’ pursuant to” this congressional delegation “nor ‘claimed’ Chevron deference for SMM [§] 3259.7.” Id. Additionally, the court had “recently observed, there are ‘few, if any, instances in which an agency manual, in particular, has been
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which is a lower degree of deference than Chevron because it only provides
“guidance” to the court 133 but only “to the extent [that] it [is] persuasive.” 134
After examining the text and structure of § 1396p(d)(4), the Second
Circuit found that the SMM had properly filled the congressional gap for
several reasons. 135 First, § 1396p(d)(4) contained no “textual limit” on the
scope of the CMS’s authority to make Medicaid eligibility and posteligibility determinations because Congress allows the CMS to fill the
gap. 136 Second, the SMM was “fully consistent” with other Medicaid provisions that require individuals to contribute their available income to pay
for their nursing home care. 137 Third, the CMS had specifically claimed
that the SMM was a binding interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4) and the provision is not ad hoc but applicable to everyone. 138 Fourth, the relevant section of the SMM was issued one year after OBRA’s enactment and had not
changed since, which showed that it was consistently followed.139 Finally,
the only legal challenge to the SMM was in Reames, which the Tenth Circuit rejected. 140
B. The Eighth and Third Circuits: § 1396p(d)(4) is Mandatory on the States
From 2000 to 2012, no federal circuit interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) held
that it was optional on the states. 141 The Eighth Circuit, however, created
the circuit split when it determined that § 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory in
the context of an individual using a pooled SNT. In Center For Special
Needs Trust Administration, Inc., v. Olson, 142 a man with a disability living
in a nursing home transferred his money into a pooled SNT, and then applied for Medicaid. 143 Because the state Medicaid agency was mistaken
about his age, it did not apply state and federal laws limiting transfers of
accorded Chevron deference.’” Id. at 258 (quoting Estate of Landers v. Leavitt, 545 F.3d 98, 106 (2d
Cir. 2008)).
133. Id. at 250 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
134. Id. at 256 (quoting Leavitt, 545 F.3d at 105).
135. Id. at 262.
136. Id. at 260.
137. Id. at 261.
138. Id. at 261-62.
139. Id. at 262.
140. Id.
141. Note that the Eighth Circuit evaluated the mandatory nature of § 1396p(d)(4), holding that a
state Medicaid agency could impose a Medicaid lien on two women’s large personal injury settlements
before the women placed the remaining funds in individual SNTs. Norwest Bank of North Dakota,
N.A., v. Doth, 159 F.3d 328, 333 (8th Cir. 1998).
142. 676 F.3d 688 (8th Cir. 2012).
143. Id. at 693. Note that the court’s opinion does not indicate the source of the man’s money.
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assets to SNTs over a certain age. 144 Medicaid then covered his nursing
home care until his death, after which the state Medicaid agency discovered
the error based on his age and demanded reimbursement from the nonprofit organization (the plaintiff) that had managed the pooled SNT. 145 In
response, the plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 1983 to stop the state Medicaid agency from demanding reimbursement. 146
In a short explanation, the Eighth Circuit held that § 1396p(d)(4) imposed a mandatory obligation on the states because the first sentence of
§ 1396p(d)(4) was “couched in mandatory terms.” 147 Further, the court
declined to apply the reasoning from Keith and Hobbs because the statute
states that the default rule “shall not” apply to SNTs. 148
Finally, in Lewis v. Alexander, the Third Circuit addressed whether
§ 1396p(d)(4) was mandatory when a state enacts a law restricting the use
of pooled SNTs. 149 In Lewis, eleven of twelve individuals in a pooled trust
(the beneficiaries) had disabilities and received Medicaid. 150 To pay for
items not covered by Medicaid, they placed their assets in pooled SNTs
144. Id. at 693-94 (noting that the federal law required that individuals under age sixty-five who
transfer assets into pooled SNTs to pay a penalty, and the state law disqualified individuals over age
sixty-five from receiving Medicaid if they transfer assets to an SNT established solely for the benefit
the individual).
145. Id. at 694.
146. Id. Before addressing these issues, the Eighth Circuit first held that pooled SNTs do not require a payback provision or place an age limit on the beneficiary. Id. at 695-96. Further, the court ruled
that the plaintiff did have standing to sue the state Medicaid agency because the state could still apply
state law to the plaintiff in the future. Id. at 696-97. Next, the court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
the state had waived its right for reimbursement by initially providing him benefits because, although it
was a mistake, there was no proof that the state had waived any right. Id. at 698. Finally, the plaintiff’s
equitable estoppel claim was denied because the state’s mistake was not affirmative misconduct. Id.
147. Id. at 700. In addressing this issue, the court also held that the plaintiff had met the other two
factors from the Blessing test: § 1396p(d)(4) clearly intended to benefit non-profit organizations because it was listed in the statute, and the right was not too vague or amorphous because beneficiaries
must meet certain elements to use pooled SNTs. See id. at 699-700 (citing Blessing v. Freestone, 520
U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997)).
148. Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc., v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 700 n.2 (8th Cir. 2012)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) (2006)). Additionally, the court ruled that Congress has not foreclosed Section 1983 enforcement of the Medicaid Act. Id.at 699-700. Finally, the court ruled that the
plaintiff did have a private cause of action under Section 1983, but its claim was without merit and
federal law did not preempt the state regulation. Id. at 700-03. Specifically, there was no conflict between the state’s regulations (requiring individuals using pooled SNTs to be under age sixty-five) and
§ 1396p(d)(4) because Congress intended that individuals over age sixty-five using these trusts would
still be subject to transfer penalty rules listed in § 1396p(c). Id.
149. 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
150. Id. at 335. Specifically, only one beneficiary was not disabled or receiving Medicaid, but that
beneficiary was the administratrix for the estate of her deceased niece, who was disabled and receiving
Medicaid at the time of her death. Id. Additionally, two charitable organizations were also plaintiffs in
this lawsuit: the first organization managed approximately $23 million in funds for its approximately
117 pooled trust accounts, and the second managed approximately $20 million in funds for its approximately 1,122 pooled trust accounts. Id. at 335-36.
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that had generally “quite low” balances.151 Because their trusts did not
comply with several provisions of a state law enacted to prevent sheltering
assets, the state Medicaid agency sought to terminate some of the beneficiaries’ Medicaid benefits. 152 In response, the beneficiaries brought a class
action suit, under both § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief to bar enforcement of the state law because it
was preempted by § 1396p(d)(4). 153
The central issue in the case was whether § 1396p(d)(4) created a
mandatory obligation on the states.154 The state argued that § 1396p(d)(4)
was optional based on the provision’s opening sentence: “This subsection
shall not apply to any of the following [SNTs].”155 According to the state,
this sentence created a legislative “gap” because it did not proscribe what
laws states may enact to regulate SNTs. 156 In turn, this allowed the states to
enact laws to fill that gap. Here, the state argued that if Congress intended
that § 1396p(d)(4) be mandatory then it would have used clear obligatory
language, such as these SNTs “shall not be counted as available assets for
determining Medicaid eligibility.”157
The Third Circuit held that the first sentence of § 1396p(d)(4) had
caused the Second and Tenth Circuits to “miss the forest for the trees.”158
Instead, the Third Circuit found that § 1396p(d)(4) imposed a mandatory
obligation on the states based on the “text and structure of the Medicaid
statute.” 159 First, the Third Circuit wrote that Congress’ “choice of an imperative like ‘shall’” gave strong textual evidence that Congress did not
intend to allow states to freely ignore § 1396p(d)(4).160 If, instead, the provision was intended to be optional, as the state claimed, then Congress
could have used “[a]ny number of [other] constructions,” such as “States
are not required to apply [§ 1396p(d)(4) to SNTs].” 161
Second, the Third Circuit noted that courts must follow all of Congress’ statutory objectives. 162 Here, Congress had two purposes for
151. Id. at 335 (most of the balances in the pooled SNTs were between a few hundred to a few
thousand dollars).
152. Id. at 337.
153. Id. at 331.
154. Id. at 342. Before turning to this issue, the Third Circuit first held that the beneficiaries had
constitutional standing, prudential standing, and a case that was not ripe. See id. at 338-42.
155. Id. at 342 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 343.
159. Id. at 344.
160. Id. at 343.
161. Id.
162. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. U.S., 480 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1987)).
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§ 1396p(d): the primary goal was to broadly prevent individuals from sheltering their assets in trusts while remaining eligible for Medicaid, but the
secondary goal was to exempt SNTs from Medicaid determinations.163
This small exception for SNTs allows individuals with disabilities to use
SNTs to pay for necessities and comforts that would “rarely be considered
extravagant.” 164 Thus, Congress intended not “merely to shelter” SNTs
from the default rule, but also “to shelter [them] from having any impact on
Medicaid eligibility.” 165
Third, the Third Circuit found that Congress made a “deliberate
choice” to “expand the federal [government’s] role” in defining and regulating SNTs with § 1396, after prior Medicaid statutes had failed to limit
Medicaid abuse. 166 Federal control over Medicaid was evidenced
“throughout the Medicaid statute,” including 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18),
which requires states to comply with all of § 1396p. 167 In effect, Congress
had “set the boundaries for what will be considered a[n SNT].”168
Fourth, the Third Circuit found that the structure of Medicaid’s assetcounting rules was the most important evidence of Congress’ intent.169 The
default rule and § 1396p(d)(4) are part of a “complex and comprehensive
system” that “rigorously dictates” what assets must count and not count
towards Medicaid eligibility. 170 By “actually legislating on this precise
class of asset[s] . . . Congress intended to create a purely binary system of
classification: either a trust affects Medicaid eligibility or it does not.”171
Therefore, the state was “not free to rewrite” § 1396p(d)(4). 172
Because the beneficiaries had a private right under both Section 1983
and the Supremacy Clause, 173 the Third Circuit turned to whether the state
law was preempted by § 1396p(d)(4). In this case, the court noted that
OBRA was not intended to displace the states’ general trust laws; 174 however, states must follow § 1396p(d)(4) and not impose any additional bur163. Lewis, 685 F.3d at 343.
164. Id. at 333.
165. Id. at 343.
166. Id. For a discussion of some of these prior laws, see infra Part III.C.
167. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18)
(2006)), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
168. Id. at 344.
169. Id. at 343.
170. Id. at 344.
171. Id. (emphasis omitted).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 345-46. Note that the Third Circuit held that the beneficiaries also had a private right
under the Supremacy Clause because they presented a federal question in seeking injunctive relief from
a state regulation. See id.
174. Id. at 347.
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dens on those requirements. 175 In conclusion, the Third Circuit held that
several provisions of the state’s law conflicted with § 1396p(d)(4) because
“Congress intended that [SNTs] be defined by a specific set of criteria that
it set forth,” not the states. 176
III. ANALYSIS: APPLYING THE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION TOOLS
Interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4) has been difficult for the state
Medicaid agencies and the federal circuits. Medicaid generally is an “extraordinarily complex set of interlocking” statutes and regulations.177 As
the Supreme Court stated, the Social Security Act’s “Byzantine construction . . . makes the Act ‘almost unintelligible to the uninitiated.’”178 Further, the CMS has not issued any regulations for § 1396p(d). 179
This Note will interpret the provision by first analyzing § 1396p(d)
with each statutory interpretation tool. Statutory analysis of § 1396p(d)(4)
must begin by observing the ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. 180
Next, this Note examines the legislative history of OBRA, the Supreme
Court’s precedent for § 1396p, and the agency interpretation. Finally, this
Part collectively analyzes the tools to conclude that § 1396p(d)(4) is best
read as being mandatory on the states based on the structure of § 1396p(d)
and the purpose of the Medicaid statute.
A. The Text of § 1396p(d)
The relevant sections of § 1396p(d), titled “Treatment of trust amounts,”
govern the relationship between SNTs and Medicaid determinations:
175. Id.
176. Id. at 347. Specifically, the Third Circuit held that § 1396p(d)(4) preempted four of the five
state law provisions at issue in the appeal. First, the state law’s requirement that fifty percent of the
pooled SNT be repaid to the state if the beneficiary dies was struck down because § 1396p(d)(4)(C)
leaves it to the discretion of the trust. Id. at 348-49. Second, the state law’s requirement that all trust
expenditures have a “reasonable relationship” to the beneficiary’s needs was preempted because
§ 1396p(d)(4) contains no similar limitation. Id. at 350. Third, the state law’s restriction of pooled SNTs
to beneficiaries only with “special needs that will not be met without the trust” and that “assist in and
are related to the treatment of the beneficiary’s disability” was struck down because § 1396p(d)(4) only
requires that the beneficiary be disabled. Id. at 350-51. Fourth, the state law’s restriction of pooled
SNTs to beneficiaries only under age sixty-five was preempted because § 1396p(d)(4) contains no age
restriction. See id. at 351-52. However, the state law’s enforcement provision—allowing the state
Medicaid agency to petition a court for an order to terminate the trust—was upheld because it was part
of the state’s retained authority to regulate trusts in the state. Id. at 352-53.
177. Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1186 (10th Cir. 2009).
178. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d
724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976)).
179. Ctr. for Special Needs Trust Admin., Inc., v. Olson, 676 F.3d 688, 700 (8th Cir. 2012).
180. See, e.g., Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 2149, 2156 (2010) (“As in all
such cases, we begin by analyzing the statutory language, assuming that the ordinary meaning of that
language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”).
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(1) For purposes of determining an individual’s eligibility for, or amount
of, benefits under a State plan under this subchapter, subject to paragraph
(4), the rules specified in paragraph (3) shall apply to a trust established
by such individual.
...
(3) [States the default rule that the corpus of a trust “shall be considered
resources available to the individual,” and that payments from the trust
“shall be considered income of the individual.”]
(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following trusts:
(A) [Requirements for the individual SNTs.]
(B) [Requirements for the income SNTs.]
(C) [Requirements for the pooled SNTs.] 181

B. Analysis of the Text
Because § 1396p(d)’s text is short and lacks sufficient guidance, it is
partly at fault for the circuit split. The text clearly states that SNTs are exempt from the default rule, but fails to indicate whether § 1396p(d)(4) is
mandatory on the states. The Third and Eighth Circuits held that the word
“shall” in both § 1396p(d)(1) and (4) means that the SNTs provisions are
mandatory. In contrast, the Second and Tenth Circuits ruled that because
the statute fails to indicate what rule applies when the default rule does not
apply, each state may fill that gap as it chooses. For example, if a mother
told her children to clean the house but said that this rule does not apply to
her oldest child, those instructions do not inform the oldest child whether
he or she must clean the house.
The Second and Tenth Circuits found that § 1396p(d) does not indicate what rule must apply to SNTs, but this argument is weak because the
text is ambiguous. If Congress had wanted to make § 1396p(d)(4) optional
or mandatory, then it could have used clear language in § 1396p(d)(4), such
as “For the following SNTs, the default rule is optional (or mandatory) on
the States.” Thus, the text helps little in interpreting whether § 1396p(d)(4)
is optional or mandatory on the states.
C. The Legislative History of § 1396p(d)(4)
Prior to § 1396p(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(k) regulated the relationship
between trusts and Medicaid eligibility, which attempted to stop Medicaid
abuse by mandating that all assets in a “Medicaid Qualifying Trust” were

181. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d) (2006). For a discussion of the specific elements of the SNTs, see supra
Part I.C.
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available to the beneficiary. 182 However, Section 1396a(k) failed to stop
Medicaid abuse, so Congress repealed the law and replaced it with
§ 1396p(d) in 1993. 183
One goal for § 1396p(d) was to place stricter requirements on
trusts. 184 Prior to § 1396p(d), trusts were viewed as the “single most offensive Medicaid estate planning vehicle” because individuals could manipulate Medicaid eligibility requirements by hiding their assets in trusts. 185
Additionally, states were having budgetary crises 186 and more individuals
were seeking Medicaid than Medicaid agencies had anticipated or were
capable of serving. 187 Thus, Congress wanted to close Medicaid’s eligibility “loopholes.” 188
The Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce addressed this issue with hearings
titled “Medicaid Budget Reconciliation.”189 The goal of the hearings was
to eliminate $7.8 billion from the Medicaid budget within five fiscal
years. 190 Special interest groups such as the long-term care insurance industry and the state Medicaid agencies, both of which wanted to increase
revenues and to reduce expenditures, mostly set the agenda for these hearings. 191 An important leader for the long-term insurance industry argued in
front of the Subcommittee that non-poor, elderly persons were causing
serious financial problems by hiding their assets in trusts. 192 In contrast, the
President of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys argued in front
of the Subcommittee that allowing states to restrict the use of trusts would
be “punishing” individuals with mostly limited assets. 193
After the hearings, an amendment was proposed to fix the Medicaid
eligibility issues, which was incorporated into the House Bill.194 As a re182. Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 958-59 (10th Cir. 2001). For a discussion of MQTs, see
Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 130.
183. Ramey, 268 F.3d at 959. Note that this § 1396a(k) should not be confused with the same titled
provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2601 (2012).
184. Ramey, 268 F.3d at 959.
185. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 703.
186. Id. at 683.
187. Id. at 734.
188. Id. at 685.
189. Id. at 683-84.
190. Id. at 684.
191. Id. at 682.
192. Id. at 688-90.
193. Medicare and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health and
the Env’t of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 426 (1993) (statement
of Vincent J. Russo, President for National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys).
194. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 684 n.15.
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sult, individual and income SNT provisions were added to the bill, 195 and
disability advocates successfully argued to include pooled SNTs.196 The
Senate Bill included identical language as compared to the current rules in
§ 1396p(d)(4), except that individual SNTs did not have an age requirement, 197 though this requirement was later added.198 Congress did not revisit the SNT provisions again, 199 and the final version of § 1396p(d)
passed on August 10, 1993. 200
D. Analysis of the Legislative History
The legislative history of OBRA and § 1396p(d)(4), which has been
aptly referred to as “sparse,” 201 offers little help to determine whether the
provision is mandatory or optional on the states. In fact, none of the federal
circuits even analyzed the legislative history of § 1396p(d)(4). One commentator argued that there is a lack of congressional records because Medicaid amendments are “always among the final parts to be added to the huge
budget reconciliation acts.” 202 Regardless, both sides of the debates argued
over how trusts should affect Medicaid eligibility. States and insurance
industry representatives wanted more restrictions to stop abuse by all trusts,
while disability advocates lobbied to keep legal protections for individuals
with disabilities.203 Beyond that, there is no affirmative evidence in the
legislative history to help interpret § 1396p(d)(4).
However, an argument could be made that the lack of legislative history for SNTs shows that § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states.
Since Congress intended to close the Medicaid loopholes with OBRA,204
but SNTs were not part of the problem 205 and there was no legislative history showing that Congress was particularly concerned with SNTs abusing
Medicaid, it seems possible that Congress did not intend to restrict use of
195. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 129.
196. Id.
197. Wiesner, supra note 37, at 713 n.130.
198. Id. Disability advocates believed that including the age requirement for individual SNTs was a
technical drafting error. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 129.
199. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 130.
200. Id. at 140.
201. Id. at 127 n.211. Further, one federal district court noted that to say there is little legislative
history for § 1396p(d)(4) is an “understatement,” and that even the “[c]ourt’s own best efforts have
uncovered no sign that Congress ever mentioned this provision in any published report.” Hobbs ex rel.
Hobbs v. Zenderman, 542 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1228 (D.N.M. 2008), aff’d, 579 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir.
2009).
202. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 128.
203. Id. at 127.
204. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
205. Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 7.
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SNTs but instead only those trusts abusing Medicaid. Nonetheless, the
legislative history (or lack thereof) is ultimately inconclusive about what
Congress intended with § 1396p(d)(4).
E. The Supreme Court’s Precedent Regarding § 1396p
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed whether § 1396p(d)(4)
is mandatory on the states, it has shed some light on how to interpret
§ 1396p(d)(4). In Arkansas Department of Health & Human Services v.
Ahlborn, 206 the state Medicaid agency paid for medical assistance after a
woman suffered severe injuries following a car accident. 207 Later, the
woman sued the tortfeasors who caused the accident seeking damages for
her past medical expenses, permanent physical injuries, future medical
expenses, past and present pain and suffering, and past and future loss of
earnings. 208 When both parties agreed to a settlement, the state Medicaid
agency asserted a lien on the settlement seeking reimbursement for the total
cost of payments made by the state for her care, even though only one-sixth
of the settlement proceeds represented payments for her past medical expenses. 209 The legal issue was which of the parties’ “competing constructions” of § 1396 was correct. 210 The plaintiff argued that the state Medicaid
agency was entitled to only the portion of the settlement that constituted
reimbursement for past medical expenses.211 In contrast, the state Medicaid
agency argued that it could demand reimbursement for the full amount of
medical assistance that it paid. 212
The Supreme Court held for the plaintiff based on the third-party liability and anti-lien provisions in the Medicaid statute. 213 First, the text of
the third-party liability provisions did not explicitly provide the state Medicaid agency with a right to collect for any expenses from liable third parties
beyond past medical care.214 The Supreme Court ruled that the state Medicaid agency’s “reading ignore[d] the rest of the provision, which makes
clear that the State” may only recover for past medical expenses. 215 Sec-

206. 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
207. Id. at 272-73.
208. Id. at 273.
209. Id. at 274. Specifically, the tortfeasors settled with the woman for $550,000.00 and the state
Medicaid agency claimed $215,645.30. Id.
210. Id. at 275.
211. Id. at 274.
212. Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 274 (2006).
213. Id. at 280.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 281 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25)(H) (2006)).
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ond, the text of § 1396p(a), containing the anti-lien provisions, “[r]ead
literally and in isolation,” prohibited states from placing liens against, or
seeking recovery of benefits paid from, Medicaid recipients. 216 Only recovery for past medical expenses was allowed because it was “expressly
provided” for in the Medicaid statute. 217
F. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Precedent
Ahlborn did not address whether § 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the
states. 218 However, the Supreme Court’s analysis shows how § 1396p(d)(4)
should be interpreted as being mandatory on the states. First, the Court
ruled that the Medicaid statute should be viewed as a whole, not each provision in isolation. 219 In Ahlborn, even though the state Medicaid agency’s
reading of one sentence within the statute supported its conclusion, it had
ignored the statute’s surrounding provisions protecting the Medicaid recipient. Second, the Court concluded that the state Medicaid agency could
recover portions of an individual’s assets only if a statute clearly provides
the state with that right. There, the statute plainly allowed for recovery of
past medical expenses, but not for recovery of future expenses or pain and
suffering.
Here, both conclusions support interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) as being
mandatory on the states. First, examining the first sentence of
§ 1396p(d)(4) in isolation, as the state Medicaid agency did in Lewis,220
ignores the detailed definitions of SNTs and surrounding provisions in
§ 1396p(d). As discussed below, the structure and purpose of § 1396p(d)
show that Congress created a binary system of rules for SNTs and nonSNTs. 221 Second, state Medicaid agencies should not be allowed to deny
Medicaid benefits unless a statute unambiguously confers that right, but as
mentioned above, § 1396p(d)(4) is unclear as to whether the provision is
mandatory. Further, in Ahlborn, the Court found that the relevant statutory
language “place[d] express limits on the State’s powers” to seek recovery
of funds from Medicaid beneficiaries. 222 Similarly, the mandatory “shall”

216. Id. at 284 (citing § 1396p(a)).
217. Id.
218. See id. at 289 (“Because the opinions in those cases address a different question from the one
posed here . . . we conclude that they do not control our analysis.”).
219. See also K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (“In ascertaining the plain
meaning of [a] statute, the court must look to the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the
language and design of the statute as a whole.”).
220. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 342-43 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
221. See infra Part III.I.
222. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 283.
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language in § 1396p(d)(4) limits the state Medicaid agencies’ discretion
regarding assets in SNTs affecting Medicaid eligibility by prohibiting them
from applying the default rule.
G. The Agency Interpretation of SNT’s Affect on Medicaid
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issues the
State Medicaid Manual (SMM) to help state Medicaid agencies administer
the program. 223 The SMM contains “official interpretations of the law and
regulations, and, as such, are binding on Medicaid State agencies.”224
While the SMM contains no provision stating whether § 1396p(d)(4) is
mandatory or optional on the states, two provisions were at issue in the
circuit split. 225 First, the SMM’s requirement that the SNT be used for the
sole benefit of the beneficiary states, “a trust is considered to be established
for the sole benefit of a spouse, blind or disabled child, or disabled individual if the trust benefits no one but that individual.”226 Second, the SMM’s
eligibility and post-eligibility rules state, “[i]ncome placed in a[n SNT] . . .
is not counted as available in determining Medicaid eligibility,” but is
“subject to the post-eligibility rules.” 227
H. Analysis of the Agency Interpretation
In terms of how much deference is properly accorded to the SMM, it
is important to note that the SMM does not constitute law, bind any court,
or warrant Chevron deference. 228 Instead, agency manuals like the SMM
are “informal” interpretations 229 entitled to Skidmore deference only if they
are persuasive. 230 However, agency interpretations receive no deference if
they conflict with the text 231 or purpose of a statute. 232
223. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 253 n.6 (2d Cir. 2009)
224. SMM, supra note 92, at § (B)(1).
225. Note that because the SMM provisions were not discussed in either Olson or Lewis, agency
interpretation was not at issue in those cases.
226. SMM, supra note 92, at § 3257(B)(6).
227. SMM, supra note 92, at § 3259.7(C)(5)(b). Note that this portion of the SMM explicitly
mentions only income SNTs, but the SMM states that it applies to all three SNTs. Id.
228. See Doar, 571 F.3d at 258-59; see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(“Interpretations such as those in . . . agency manuals . . . lack the force of law [and] do not warrant
Chevron-style deference.”). But see Wis. Dep’t. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,
496 n.13 (2002)(the Supreme Court has “long noted Congress’ delegation of extremely broad regulatory authority to the Secretary [of the HHS] in the Medicaid area.”).
229. Sai Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 2009).
230. Gonzales v. Or., 546 U.S. 243, 256 (2006) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134,
140 (1944)).
231. See, e.g., Ohio Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (“[N]o deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of the statute itself.”).
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Here, the SMM’s sole benefit rule correctly follows the statute, but its
post-eligibility rule does not.233 The SMM’s sole benefit rule is consistent
with OBRA because § 1396p(d)(4) clearly states that all SNTs must be
established for the benefit of the individual. 234 The SMM’s post-eligibility
rule, however, conflicts with the text of the statute because § 1396p(d)(1)
specifically states that the default rule for trusts does not apply when determining an individual’s “eligibility” and “amount of” Medicaid benefits. 235 Additionally, since CMS did not explain why it interpreted
§ 1396p(d) in the way that it did, 236 the SMM’s post-eligibility rule might
not even warrant Skidmore deference. 237 As in Ahlborn, courts should “decline to treat [an] agency’s reasoning as controlling” when it shows a “conscious disregard for the statutory text.” 238 Because the SMM is poorly
written, 239 contains confusing cross-references, 240 and has even confused
astute federal judges, 241 state Medicaid agencies should not follow the
SMM’s post-eligibility rules. Therefore, § 1396p(d)(4) should not be read
as being optional on the states based on the SMM.

232. Ramey v. Reinertson, 268 F.3d 955, 963 (10th Cir. 2001).
233. Note that the Tenth Circuit in Reames did not rely solely on the SMM and therefore was
correct in its holding. See Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1172 (10th
Cir. 2005) (“[W]e cannot ignore the plain language of the [Social Security statute governing payment of
Social Security benefits], which expressly forbids assignment of Social Security benefits.”).
234. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B), (C)(iii) (2006).
235. § 1396p(d)(1).
236. See Sai Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Sai
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
237. See, e.g., Detsel v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) (Skidmore deference was not
warranted since the agency “failed to produce any evidence indicating the rationale for [its] interpretation”), see also Boykin v. Key Corp., 521 F.3d 202, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (since an agency provided little
“explanation of the considerations or reasoning underlying its practice” the agency interpretation was
not entitled to Skidmore deference).
238. Ark. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 292 (2006).
239. See, e.g., Jacqueline d. Farinella, Note, Come on in, the Water’s Fine: Opening Up the Special
Needs Pooled Trust to the Eligible Elderly Population, 14 ELDER L.J. 127, 152 (2006) (arguing the
SMM “inadequately guides” state Medicaid agencies “by listing the criteria of a [pooled SNT] with the
exact language used in the statute” and “confusingly assert[ing] that establishing a [pooled SNT] ‘may
or may not constitute a transfer of assets for less than fair market value’”).
240. See, e.g., Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1169 n.4 (10th Cir.
2005) (noting how the SMM states that the section for pooled SNTs applies to individual SNTs).
241. For example, in Reames, the Tenth Circuit stated, “Oklahoma sets forth its policies for administering Medicaid benefits in its [SMM].” Id. at 1169. However, as discussed above, the CMS writes the
SMM, not any state. See SMM, supra note 92.
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I. Conclusion: § 1396p(d)(4) is Best Read as Being Mandatory
Interpreting the Medicaid statute can be difficult due to the sometimes-unclear text and thin legislative history. 242 The Second and Tenth
Circuits, however, were persuaded that § 1396p(d)(4) is optional on the
states by focusing on the lack of clear language stating that the provision is
mandatory. However, this argument “ignores the simplest and clearest explanation: that Congress excepted [assets in SNTs] from all eligibility and
benefits calculations [and therefore] [n]o gap exists” for the states to legislate. 243 Thus, the most logical interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4) is evidenced
from the structure and overall purpose of § 1396p(d), and other provisions
within the Medicaid statute, which show that § 1396p(d)(4) should be
mandatory on the states. 244
In enacting § 1396p(d), Congress had two goals in mind: to prevent
non-SNTs from abusing Medicaid, and to create a narrow exception for
SNTs. 245 The structure of the statute follows these goals because in
§ 1396p(d) Congress created a “comprehensive” and “binary system”
where a person is attempting to use a trust and receive Medicaid. 246 First, if
the person is not using a SNT, then the default rule in § 1396p(d)(3) clearly
controls and thus, the assets in the trust must be counted when determining
the person’s Medicaid eligibility. Second, if the person is using a SNT, then
§ 1396p(d)(1) states that the default rule does not apply and the SNT must
meet the specific elements listed in § 1396p(d)(4). Both § 1396p(d)(1) and
(4) also contain mandatory language that place SNTs in a separate category
from all non-SNTs. Therefore, Congress enacted this binary system to create mandatory rules for both non-SNTs and SNTs.
However, to interpret § 1396p(d)(4) as being optional on the states requires disregarding one-half of Congress’ binary system because then states
may freely create any rule for SNTs. In other words, § 1396p(d)(4) has no
utility if a state wishes to ignore those provisions. But the Second and
Tenth Circuits failed to explain why Congress, after meticulously defining
SNTs, would it leave it up to the states to decide how SNTs are regulated.
242. See Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 279 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the
Medicaid statute as a “morass of bureaucratic complexity”).
243. Sai Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Sai
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009). Note that the Second Circuit disagreed with the
district court’s interpretation and instead accorded Skidmore deference to the SMM because there was
“ambiguity as to Congress’ intent” in § 1396p(d)(4). Doar, 571 F.3d at 256 n.11.
244. See, e.g., Crandon v. U.S., 494 U.S. 152, 158 (1990) (“In determining the meaning of the
statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and to its object and policy.”).
245. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325, 343 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
246. Id. at 332, 344.
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Instead, to give “full effect to [both] of Congress’ statutory objectives” 247
of preventing Medicaid abuse and exempting SNTs from Medicaid determinations, § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states.
Besides § 1396p(d)(1) and (4), other provisions within the Medicaid
statute provide convincing evidence that § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states. First, Congress required states to comply with all of
§ 1396p, including the SNT provisions. 248 Second, in § 1396p(d)(5), Congress granted a state discretion to “waive” the rules in § 1396p(d) if an
individual within the state would suffer an “undue hardship,” but only if the
state’s waiver procedure is approved by the HHS Secretary. 249 This means
that Congress created an exception to § 1396p(d)(4) but only if it harms the
individual, not the state—and even then, the state’s waiver is still subject to
the federal government’s control. Finally, when Congress intended for the
states to have discretion it used clear, repetitive language—”at the option of
[a] state”—at least six times within § 1396p to indicate such discretion. 250
It makes no sense to say that Congress created an optional rule in
§ 1396p(d)(4)—couched in mandatory terms—but did not include the same
discretionary language used repeatedly throughout the same section of the
statute. In sum, both § 1396p(d) and several other provisions within the
Medicaid statute strongly support interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) as being mandatory on the states.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Legitimate policy considerations also support the interpretation that
§ 1396p(d)(4) is best read as being mandatory on the states, including (1)
protecting those with disabilities, (2) rejecting the states’ “sheltering assets” argument, and (3) interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) uniformly.
A. Beneficiaries with Disabilities
Section 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory on the states because individuals with disabilities cannot benefit from SNTs unless the assets in the
trusts are exempt from Medicaid eligibility and benefit determinations. The

247. Id. at 343.
248. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2006).
249. See § 1396p(d)(5).
250. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 15-16, Keith v. Rizzuto, 531 U.S. 960 (2000) (No. 00437), 2000 WL 34000749 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1)(B)(ii), (b)(4)(B), (c)(1)(A), (c)(1)(C)(ii),
(c)(1)(E)(i)(II), (c)(1)(E)(ii)(II) (2006)).
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Medicaid program was initially created to help those with disabilities.251
The entire purpose for SNTs, however, is to “mitigate the inadequacies of
government benefit programs” for individuals with disabilities by having
SNTs pay for their non-medical needs.252 These individuals struggle to pay
for both their medical and non-medical needs because they often have severe physical and/or cognitive impairments. 253 In fact, § 1396p(d)(4) itself
requires that individuals have a statutorily defined disability or live in a
nursing home to use the SNTs. 254 However, if a state Medicaid agency
counts assets in a SNT when determining Medicaid eligibility, an individual with a disability residing in that state is presented with a catch-22: either
receive Medicaid and be prohibited from using SNTs; or use a SNT and
automatically become ineligible for Medicaid. This ultimatum effectively
swallows any utility for SNTs because individuals with disabilities cannot
use SNTs to pay for things that Medicaid will not cover.
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized the importance of
preventing states from excluding individuals otherwise eligible for public
aid under the Social Security Act. In Townsend v. Swank, 255 the Court held
that a state could not alter eligibility requirements for a federal aid program
without “congressional authorization . . . clearly evidenced from the Social
Security Act or its legislative history.” 256 Further, the “principle that accords substantial weight to interpretation of [the] statute” is that “aid be
furnished ‘to all eligible individuals.’” 257 Here, because both the Medicaid
statute generally and the SNT provisions help individuals with disabilities,
the states should be prohibited from counting assets in SNTs when making
Medicaid determinations.
B. The “Sheltering Assets” Argument
One of the biggest arguments for why it has been argued that
§ 1396p(d)(4) should be optional on the states is the fear that beneficiaries,
especially those with great wealth, will shelter their assets in SNTs while
receiving Medicaid benefits. 258 However, the Medicaid statute limits this
251. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012) (“Enacted in
1965, Medicaid offers federal funding to States to assist pregnant women, children, needy families, the
blind, the elderly, and the disabled in obtaining medical care.”) (emphasis added).
252. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 94.
253. Id. at 109.
254. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B)(iii), (C) (2012).
255. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
256. Id. at 286.
257. Id. (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)).
258. Federalism concerns also clearly play a part in these situations. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557
U.S. 433, 448 (2009) (“Federalism concerns are heightened when . . . [the federal government’s man-
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abuse by requiring that a SNT be used only for the benefit of the beneficiary. 259 Additionally, both individual and income SNTs require a payback
provision where the remaining assets in the SNT must be used to first pay
back the state for all of its expenditures after the beneficiary’s death. 260
This represented a “bargain” between the states and the beneficiaries: the
beneficiary remains eligible for Medicaid while using the SNT, but the
state will be paid back before the beneficiary may give any remaining assets to his or her heirs. 261 Moreover, while pooled SNTs do not require a
payback provision, the beneficiary’s heirs will not receive any remaining
assets in the trust because the state is reimbursed for the amount of medical
expenses previously paid to the beneficiary except for those “retained by
the trust.” 262 The funds kept by the trust could be used to pay for administrative costs, given to charity, used to create additional trust accounts for
new beneficiaries, or used to provide additional items and services to the
existing beneficiaries.263 Finally, a beneficiary must still satisfy a state
Medicaid lien from the proceeds of a tort settlement against a third party
before depositing any of the settlement into the SNT. 264
Nonetheless, even if individuals try to use SNTs to shelter their assets,
states have other means to stop the abuse. One tool is to enact a state law
that limits Medicaid abuse through trusts, 265 as Congress did not intend to
displace state trust law with OBRA. 266 In fact, state law, not federal law,
generally governs the laws surrounding SNTs, 267 which developed sometime during the latter part of the twentieth century. 268 States can also petition Congress to change § 1396p(d) or withdraw from the Medicaid
program entirely if SNTs continue to abuse their Medicaid programs. 269

date] has the effect of dictating state or local budget priorities” because “[s]tates and local governments
have limited funds.”).
259. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B), (C)(iii) (2006).
260. See § 1396p(d)(4)(A), (B)(ii).
261. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 131.
262. § 1396p(d)(4)(C)(iv).
263. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 135.
264. Sullivan v. Cnty. of Suffolk, 174 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 1999).
265. However, state laws must not conflict with any federal law. See Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d
325, 350 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
266. See id. at 347.
267. Sai Kwan Wong v. Daines, 582 F. Supp. 2d 475, 479 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d sub nom., Sai
Kwan Wong v. Doar, 571 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
268. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 144.
269. However, states may have difficulty petitioning Congress for change considering the political
process, and withdrawing from the Medicaid program may be unrealistic given the need for federal
funding.
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Ultimately, individuals sheltering assets in trusts caused problems for
state Medicaid agencies and likely will continue to do so. 270 SNTs, however, were not the type of trusts that were abusing the Medicaid system when
Congress enacted § 1396p(d). 271 Furthermore, one commentator has suggested that SNTs could actually save state resources, because when beneficiaries use SNTs to provide for their non-medical needs, they may need
less publicly funded medical care. 272 In sum, because the sheltering assets
argument fails to account for the legal protections afforded to the states, it
cannot be used to interpret § 1396p(d)(4) as being optional on the states.
C. A Uniform Interpretation
The circuit split over interpreting § 1396p(d)(4) has created several
problems. 273 However, the split will not be solved soon, as the Supreme
Court has denied writ of certiorari for Keith, 274 Reames, 275 and Lewis. 276
Because the primary benefit of having one federal statute governing SNTs
is clarity for all parties,277 § 1396p(d)(4) should be mandatory to make sure
that jurisdictions do not differ in their interpretation of the provision. 278
Section 1396p(d)(4) should be uniformly interpreted to assist as those
harmed by an inconsistent interpretation. First, the beneficiaries and their
family members must discover their jurisdiction’s interpretation and their
state’s laws regarding trusts. 279 If a beneficiary’s SNT complies with his or
her state’s trust laws, then the beneficiary may not bring the SNT to another state that either has different laws regarding SNTs or does not exempt
270. See, e.g., Johnson v. Guhl, 357 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Because Medicaid is available
to the needy, creative lawyers and financial planners have devised various ways to ‘shield’ wealthier
claimants’ assets in determining Medicaid eligibility.”).
271. Radford & Bryan, supra note 8, at 7.
272. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 96 n.25. Additionally, an SNT allows an individual with a
disability who receives a personal injury settlement or verdict to use the SNT to pay for items that
Medicaid fails to pay for. See id. at 136.
273. See Farinella, supra note 239, at 129 (arguing that “careless drafting [of § 1396p(d)(4)(C)] has
led to a number of other difficult and even dangerous outcomes, including disparate treatment under
state law and disparate structures by the managing nonprofit organizations”).
274. Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 960 (2000).
275. Reames v. Okla. ex rel. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
546 U.S. 1225 (2006).
276. Lewis v. Alexander, 685 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 933 (2013).
277. Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 123.
278. Note that all three types of SNTs should be treated the same when courts interpret
§ 1396p(d)(4). See Hobbs ex rel. Hobbs v. Zenderman, 579 F.3d 1171, 1180 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that because all SNTs under § 1396p(d)(4) use the “same statutory language” there is no reason to
treat them differently in terms of their mandatory obligations on the states).
279. See Rosenberg, supra note 34, at 123 (“Some states rely on the common law and ‘generic’
trust statutes to guide the interpretation of SNTs. Other states have enacted specific statutes that govern
supplemental needs trusts.”).
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SNTs from Medicaid determinations. Second, state Medicaid agencies
administering the program must discover their federal jurisdiction’s interpretation of § 1396p(d)(4). If the SNT is created in a jurisdiction that has
not yet ruled on the issue, 280 then both the beneficiaries and the state Medicaid agencies must spend time, energy, and resources to argue their interpretations of the provision to the federal district courts, and possibly
through the appeals process. Third, the attorneys drafting the SNTs must
stay informed of all these developments to best protect their clients’ assets,
which can be difficult given the complexity of the Medicaid statute and
regulations, 281 and the sheer amount of legal fields in which these attorneys
must have expertise. 282
All parties involved in these issues need a clear and simple rule to follow. 283 One can reasonably assume that when Congress expanded the federal government’s role in regulating SNTs, one of its goals was to create
uniformity. Therefore, to avoid having the federal circuits differ in their
interpretations of § 1396p(d)(4), the provision should be mandatory on all
states.
CONCLUSION
The current circuit split over the relationship between Medicaid and
supplemental needs trusts threatens the increasing use of SNTs.284 The
circuits holding that § 1396p(d)(4) is optional on the states have gotten
“lost in the Medicaid maze” by focusing primarily on its unclear text.285
However, after examining the text of § 1396p(d), and the relevant policy
considerations, it becomes clear that Congress wanted to exempt assets in
SNTs from Medicaid determinations. Therefore, § 1396p(d)(4) is best read
as being mandatory on the states based on the entire forest, not just the
trees.

280. Currently, only the Second, Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have interpreted whether
§ 1396p(d)(4) is mandatory on the states.
281. Hobbs, 579 F.3d at 1186.
282. The category of legal fields that these attorneys might be required to know includes, but is not
limited to, disability law, tax law, long-term investments, Medicaid eligibility and benefits (and potentially SSI issues), trusts and estate law, and liability issues.
283. Additionally, at least one commentator has suggested that Congress amend § 1396p(d)(4)(C)
to indicate more clearly how pooled SNTs should be administered, and that the CMS should also include a model pooled SNT in the SMM to guide the states. See Farinella, supra note 239, at 164-65.
284. See Lacey & Nadler, supra note 34, at 247 (“[I]interest in and demand for Special Needs
Trusts (SNTs) is on the rise.”).
285. Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 282 (1982).

